Prenuptial Agreements Can Protect Your Spouse from Lawsuits – a look at Elia v Pifer
Prenuptial Agreements Can Protect Your Spouse from Lawsuits – a look at Elia v Pifer Prenups can allow couples to…
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In Arizona law, Grandparents Rights are defined as “Third party rights”.
For such a simple question, the answer is complicated. The simplest explanation is that Grandparents do not have a Constitutional right to see their grandchildren or direct their upbringing.
But Grandparents can seek a court order for visitation with their grandchildren and in some cases, for custody of their grandchildren.
Parents have a Constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of their children. Included within that set of rights is the right to exclude individuals from their children’s lives, including a child’s grandparents.
No Constitutional right is absolute. Speech may be the Right with the strongest protections, but even then, no one has the right to shout fire in a crowded theater. Parental rights also have limits.
In Arizona law, Grandparents Rights are defined as “Third party rights”.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that, while parents have a Constitutional right regarding their children, states may nonetheless permit grandparents and other third parties to seek visitation with the grandchildren so long as the family court gives “special weight” to a parent’s decision regarding visitation.
Therefore, Grandparents may, in certain circumstances, ask the Court to override a parents’ decision to deny them visitation. Moreover, in situations where the child’s safety may be at risk, grandparents can ask the Court to award them custody. But, in both cases, the law carefully protects the parents’ Constitutional rights.
A.R.S. § 25-409 is the Arizona law that governs the ability of grandparents and other third parties to obtain an order regarding visitation or custody.
Although it may appear clear at first glance, A.R.S. § 25-409 is a complicated law.
The law has two different schemes and contains unusual analysis that divides the analysis between initial pleading and trial but not exclusively. It requires an analysis of one issue but leaves the analysis of other issues completely open. It also restricts who may bring a lawsuit while also expanding who may bring a lawsuit. It hinges on undefined terms, contradicts other statutes, and must be read with other statutes for one to understand the complete analysis.
The Arizona Legislature’s recent changes to the law only seem to add to the complexity of the statute. The surrounding case law has not been a model of clarity either—every few years, the Court of Appeals or Arizona Supreme Court issue a ruling that changes significantly how the statute is interpreted.
A few years ago, we handled an appeal of a third-party rights case. In that case, the judge issued a final ruling, seemingly out of nowhere.
No hearing or trial had been held, but the judge reviewed some of the case law interpreting A.R.S. § 25-409 and determined that an immediate ruling dismissing the petition was necessary. The Minute Entry made clear that the judge was confused about the standards of the statute.
We appealed the ruling. Sometimes, when you file an appeal, a judge might feel aggrieved. In this instance, the judge appeared to be relieved that we were appealing her ruling. In fact, she issued a second Minute Entry telling the Court of Appeals that she was confused by the statute and the case law and asking the Court to clarify certain parts of the law.
Later, our managing partner, Robbie Hendricks, argued before a panel of the Court of Appeals as they tried to work through the difficult statute and determine why the judge had been confused. During Mr. Hendricks’ Oral Argument, one of the judges asked him what he thought the problem was. Mr. Hendricks replied, “Honestly, it’s 409.” The panel judges looked at each other, smiled and nodded, and one of the judges responded, “We certainly agree.” They agreed that the third-party rights law is unclear and creates confusion.
The first statutory scheme presented in A.R.S. § 25-409 is for “legal decision-making and placement.” A grandparent seeking these rights is seeking something akin to guardianship or custody of the child.
Legal decision-making is a form of custody. Historically, it was even called “legal custody.” It is the right to make decisions on behalf of the grandchild when it comes to their education, healthcare, religious, and personal care decisions. Placement is not defined by the statute, and the Court of Appeals has not yet defined it either. Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 253 Ariz. 569 ¶ 15 (App. 2022). Though a precise definition has yet to be determined, “placement” would seem to mean that the child is placed in the Grandparents’ care and would reside exclusively (or close to it) with grandparents.
It fits one of the situations described in A.R.S. § 25-409(A)(4). Under that statute, grandparents can only bring a case if one of the following applies: (1) one of the parents is deceased, (2) The parents are not married to each other at the time of filing, or (3) the parents have a divorce case pending. In other words, if the parents are both married and alive, Grandparents are not going to be able to bring a case for legal decision-making or placement.
The first statutory scheme presented in A.R.S. § 25-409 is for “legal decision-making and placement.” A grandparent seeking these rights is seeking something akin to guardianship or custody of the child.
Legal decision-making is a form of custody. Historically, it was even called “legal custody.” It is the right to make decisions on behalf of the grandchild when it comes to their education, healthcare, religious, and personal care decisions. Placement is not defined by the statute, and the Court of Appeals has not yet defined it either. Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 253 Ariz. 569 ¶ 15 (App. 2022). Though a precise definition has yet to be determined, “placement” would seem to mean that the child is placed in the Grandparents’ care and would reside exclusively (or close to it) with grandparents.
Not every grandparent can seek legal decision-making and placement. In fact, most grandparents cannot seek these rights. The Legislature has strictly limited the class of grandparents who may qualify for these rights. To bring a Petition for Legal Decision-making and Placement, a grandparent must meet all four requirements described in A.R.S. § 25-409(A):
The statute imposes another requirement on Grandparents bringing a case. Their initial Petition must establish all four of the elements described above. This is especially important regarding the first two elements. The Grandparents need to do more than just say that they stand in loco parentis to the child and that it would be significantly detrimental for the child remain in either parent’s care.
The Grandparents must show detailed facts in their petition that, if true, would establish those elements. If Grandparents do not make such a showing, the Court is required to deny their petition at the outset of the litigation—although technically the Court may dismiss Grandparents’ petition on those grounds at any time during the proceedings.
If Grandparents are able to meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 25-409(A), then the Court considers the case on the merits.
Then, the Grandparents are going to meet an additional challenge under A.R.S. § 25-409(B). That statute imposes a burden on grandparents by assigning a rebuttable presumption that awarding legal decision-making to a legal parent serves the child’s best interests.
To rebut this presumption, a grandparent must show clear and convincing evidence (which means evidence that is “highly probable or reasonably certain”) that legal decision-making is not in the child’s best interest. The statute strangely does not mention any legal standard for how placement is to be determined. And to date, case law has not addressed the issue.
There is also some confusion as to whether the invocation of “best interests” requires the Court to make the best interests findings in accordance with A.R.S. § 25-403(A). In one unpublished, non-precedent-setting case, the Court of Appeals found it was an error for the Court to not explain under A.R.S. § 25-403(B) how it reached its decision regarding legal decision-making and placement.
In Hustrulid, the trial judge believed that under the wording of A.R.S. § 25-409(A) she could not revisit the elements of that statute at trial, but instead, she was limited to just reviewing whether initial filing had sufficient facts to create a case. For example, under this judge’s interpretation, her chance to determine whether it would be significantly detrimental for the child to remain in either parent’s care would be limited to reviewing what was in the initial petition. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The trial court must analyze those elements at trial as well and determine whether Grandparents have established them.
Under what circumstances can a grandparent file for visitation?
The Legislature limits who can file for visitation by limiting it to the following situations described in A.R.S. § 25-409(C):
Because parents have a Constitutional right to the care, custody and control of their children. In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000), a case involving grandparent visitation and a statute out of the state of Washington. A plurality of the Court determined that the visitation law violated the Constitution because it failed to give “special weight” to a parent’s determination that the grandparents should not have visitation with the children. Special weight was not defined.The meaning of “special weight” has been a major part of the pendulum swings in case law interpreting grandparents rights ever since.
A year after Troxel, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not define special weight but determined that the special weight should, at a minimum, prevent visitation orders based solely on the judge’s determination of the child’s best interests or the judge’s mere disagreement with a parental decision. McGovern v. McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, 178 (App. 2001).
Then, in 2016, the Court of Appeals changed course, as it not only defined special weight but did so in a way that essentially eliminated render most third-party visitation petitions dead on arrival. In that case, the Court of Appeals held, “[W]e interpret “special weight” to mean that the parents’ determination is controlling unless a parental decision clearly and substantially impairs a child’s best interests. Goodman v. Forsen, 239 Ariz. 110, 590 ¶ 13 (App. 2016).
A year later, another panel of the Court of Appeals determined that, when both parents are fit parents, the special weight standard did not apply when the parents disagreed on visitation. Friedman v. Roels, 397 P.3d 1063, 1068 ¶ 21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
In 2018, the Arizona Supreme Court finally weighed in. The Arizona Supreme Court struck down the Goodman definition and left again the term undefined but to be interpreted in accordance with Troxel and McGovern. Friedman v. Roels (In re Marriage of Friedman), 418 P.3d 884, 889 ¶ 20(Ariz. 2018). The Arizona Supreme Court also adopted the idea that contradictory parental opinions on visitation cancel each other out, and in such instances, no special weight is applied; rather, the court determines the matter strictly on a child’s best interests. Id. at ¶ 34. But the Arizona Supreme Court discarded the Court of Appeals’ rule that only the opinions of fit parents are to be accorded special weight; rather, the Supreme Court instead held that if a parent’s rights have not been terminated, they must be afforded special weight, regardless of fitness. Id. at ¶ 32.
As it sits, special weight does not serve as a bar to grandparent visitation, but it does give parents an advantage in a visitation case unless the parents disagree.
In addition to applying the special weight standard, the court must also consider the following factors from A.R.S. § 25-409(E) in making its determination:
At the end of 2022, we had yet another pendulum swing on visitation. In in re Borja, 522 P.3d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022), the Court of Appeals held that even where a court awards visitation, its award must be minimally intrusive on a parent’s rights. In that case, the Court of Appeals then went through the trial court’s visitation award, striking down a variety of orders within the trial court’s orders for violating the minimally intrusive standard. From Borja, we now can surmise that on a visitation order, a Court cannot order the following:
A.R.S. § 25-409(F) provides, “If logistically possible and appropriate, the court shall order visitation by a grandparent or great-grandparent if the child is residing or spending time with the parent through whom the grandparent or great-grandparent claims a right of access to the child.”
Grandparent visitation, like all other petitions touching on the custody of a child, must be filed in the state that has jurisdiction for the child. Therefore, we first ask whether any state has entered a custody order regarding the child. If so, does the child or a parent or person acting as a parent remain in the state? If yes, then that state has jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 25-1032.
If no custody order has ever been issued, then we ask where the child has lived most recently for six consecutive months; that state is the home state and has jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 25-1031 and A.R.S. § 25-1002(7) (For children under six months of age, the home state is the state where the child was born, provided the child has continued to reside in that state).
If a custody case has been started, Grandparents must file their request in the same case where that determination was made. A.R.S. § 25-409(G). If that case was out of state, Arizona is now the state with jurisdiction, Grandparents may need to “domesticate” the prior order by registering it with the Court. If no order has ever been issued, Grandparents must file in the county where the child permanently resides. A.R.S. § 25-402(B)(2). But see Olesen v. Daniel, 484 P.3d 139, 142 ¶¶ 11-12 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021) (explaining that A.R.S. §25-402(B) is merely a venue statute, and if not challenged in the first filing, it is waived).
A visitation order does not prevent the child from being adopted. Moreover, if the child is adopted, the court’s visitation order is automatically terminated. See A.R.S. § 25-409(H).
None. Grandparents have the same rights as any other third party with the exception they can file for visitation for a child who was born into wedlock once their parents have been divorced for three months. In all other contexts, their rights are the exact same as any other third party.
The reason for this finds its origins in Finck v. O’Toole, 179 Ariz. 404, 407 (Ariz. 1994). In that case, the mother had a child two months before she married her husband. He and his family believed he was the father of the child. Although she knew differently, she never told him or his family until she initiated the divorce proceedings. At the time of the divorce proceedings, the child was living with and had a very close relationship with the husband’s parents. They filed for visitation. The Arizona Supreme Court held they could not seek visitation rights under the statute as it was then written because at the time visitation was limited, by statute, to non-custodial parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents. The Arizona Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that all other individuals were precluded from seeking visitation because the Legislature had not authorized anyone who was not a biological relative to file for visitation.
In a special concurrence, Chief Justice Zlaket wrote a scathing rebuke of the majority’s reasoning, arguing that it was far more likely that Legislature did not fully consider the issue rather than purposefully omitted step-grandparents. He then called on the Legislature to rectify the situation. His words are worth consideration:
There is yet another reason why these questions cry out for legislative clarification. In this case, for example, everyone except the mother was under the impression that the stepfather was the natural father of the child until the divorce was filed. The step-grandparents had taken care of and bonded with this child, believing all along that he was their flesh and blood, only to have a cruel trick played on them which now results in the harsh reality that they may be unable to see him again. Under our decision today, the same result would presumably be reached if a “father” in such a situation sought visitation with a child he thought was his and had raised as his own. Thus, it might be argued that all fathers, married or unmarried, would be well-advised to get blood tests before emotionally investing in relationships with children who might later be completely taken from them. And, stepparents should be cautioned at the outset about the emotional risks of getting close to the children of their spouses. The same dangers face step-grandparents and great-grandparents who dare to engage in such meaningful relationships. All of this seems ludicrous to me, particularly at a time when we so often lament the loss of family ties and values. Id. at 408-409.
Chief Justice Zlaket’s words clearly detailed an incredibly large problem with he law as it then existed. The Legislature responded to the Finck rule by expanding the class of individuals who may seek visitation rights. The limits now are not so much a matter of who may file, but rather limitations on when one might file and when the Court may grant visitation.
This is defined by statute. A.R.S. § 25-401(4) reads, “‘Legal parent’ means a biological or adoptive parent whose parental rights have not been terminated. Legal parent does not include a person whose paternity has not been established pursuant to section 25-812 or 25-814.” Under this definition, the biological father may not necessarily be a legal parent. How he becomes a legal parent is complicated and not something worth discussing here. In short, if the biological father is not on the birth certificate and has not filed to establish paternity with the court, he is likely not a legal parent. Also, be aware if the mother was in a same-sex marriage at the time of the child’s birth, chances are that her wife is a legal parent.
No. The Legislature has opted to not permit that.
Only in limited circumstances. Once three months have passed since the divorce, the child’s grandparents have this option at any time. As for everyone else, a strict reading of A.R.S. § 25-409(C) would suggest that persons other than grandparents have a limited one-time opportunity to file for visitation—and that is at the time the parents are getting divorced, and even, only if the person qualifies as in loco parentis, meaning they have a parent-like relationship with the child. This again would be a strict reading of the statute; it is possible courts may not read it as strictly.
OK, this might be a question only attorneys would ask, but there’s a reason why we ask it, and that reason is A.R.S. § 8-117. That law states that when a child is adopted, the law will treat that child “as though the child were born to the adoptive parent in lawful wedlock.” That was the issue in Sheets v. Mead, 238 Ariz. 55 (App. 2015) where a lesbian couple had been foster parents to a child. They intended to raise the child together, but because same-sex marriage was not legal at the time, only one of them could adopt the child. Thereafter, they broke up, and the adoptive mother blocked her former partner from seeing the child. Her former partner filed for third-party visitation on the basis that the child was not born in lawful wedlock. The Court of Appeals held that when a child is adopted before a visitation petition is filed, a third party cannot bring a visitation petition on the basis that the child was born out of wedlock. Sheets v. Mead, 238 Ariz. 55, 58 ¶ 16 (App. 2015). That ruling was, for obvious, widely viewed as unjust. The Legislature has since responded by changing the law to override Sheets by introducing A.R.S. § 25-409(I), which provides, “For the purposes of this section, a child who is adopted may be treated as if born in lawful wedlock only if the child is adopted jointly by parents who are married to one another as provided in section 8-103, subsection A.”
The law does not define it, and Hustrulid v. Stakebake, the Court of Appeals declined to define it. From context, it is clearly a right akin to parenting time, and more precisely, akin to being designated primary residential parent or being named the guardian of a child. But the Legislature has purposefully withheld the use of “parenting time” from the statute, suggesting that this right, while similar, is less than the right of parenting time. All that said, the simplest explanation for placement is that it is similar to having guardianship of a child.
Legal decision-making and placement are custodial rights; if granted, Grandparents would be taking custody from the parents. Visitation is asking to spend time with the child.
That would exceed the minimally intrusive standard set forth in in re Borja. Visitation orders are supposed to intrude upon a parent’s rights with the child as little as possible.
Under current case law, no. Borja was quite clear that a Court cannot order a parent to facilitate phone calls with a child.
No. In Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 516 P.3d 18, 25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022), the Court of Appeals held that a third party cannot share joint legal decision-making with a parent.
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